Does Corporate Giving Signal Firm Quality? by Li, Ying et al.
DOES CORPORATE GIVING SIGNAL FIRM QUALITY? 
 
Ying Li 
University of Washington Bothell 
 
Kiyoung Chang 
University of South Florida 
 
Hoje Jo 
Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University 
 
Abstract 
This study explores whether and how firms can use corporate giving strategically to signal firm 
quality. Drawing on signaling theory, we posit that managers could use unexpected cash giving 
to disseminate their private information on improvement in future corporate financial 
performance. Further, such signaling mechanism will only be effective when signals are 
interpreted as credible for quality. Our empirical analyses on a sample of U.S. firms with 
information on cash donation from the ASSET4 database during the period of 2002 to 2012 lend 
support for our signaling-hypothesis prediction: that positive unexpected cash giving by no or 
low dividend paying, high-growth, and well-governed firms is associated with improved return 
on assets (ROA) and increased excess risk-adjusted buy-and-hold returns.  
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